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Why Does New Hampshire Matter 
Simultaneous v.s. Sequential Election with
Multiple Candidates
Pei-yu Melody Lo
Abstract
I study and compare preference aggregation in a simultaneous and
a sequential multicandidate election. Voters have perfect information
about their own preference but do not know the median voters preference.
A voter has an incentive to vote for her second choice for fear that a
tie between her second and third choice is more likely than she would
like. Therefore, a voter may want to coordinate with supports of her
second choice. I show that when voters preference intensity for their
rst choice is moderate, in the limit as the electorate increases, there is a
unique equilibrium in the voting game within one voting round exhibiting
multi-candidate support. In such an equilibrium, the ex ante probability
that a candidate wins increases in her supporters preference intensity
and decreases in her opponentspreference intensity. There is too much
coordination with supporters of a voters second choice in that sometimes
the median voters second choice wins the election. A sequential election
allows later voters to coordinate with earlier voters. Therefore, in the
last voting round, votes are split between the two front runners. The
voting outcome in the rst round a¤ects the voting behavior of the second
round. A victory of a voters favorite candidate in the rst round may
change the outcome of the second round from the voters second choice to
her favorite candidate or from her last choice to her second choice. When
preference intensity is moderate, voters vote more for their rst choice if
they vote rst in a sequential election than in a simultaneous election, and
the probability that the median voters rst choice does not win a voting
round is smaller if voting takes place sequentially. Using this model, I
show that in a sequential election with ex ante identical states, no matter
who the median voter in New Hampshire is, voting rst is better than
voting second if preference intensity is small.
1 Introduction
The outcomes of early elections play an out-of-proportion role in the US Presi-
dential primary. Adam (1987) reports that the 1984 New Hampshire primary
got nearly 20% of the seasons coverage in ABC,CBS, NBC and the New York
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Times, even though New Hampshire accounts for only 0.4% of the US popula-
tion, and only four votes out of 538 electoral votes in the presidential election.
In the 1980 Republican primaries, George Bush and Ronald Reagan spent about
3/4 of their respective campaign budgets in early primary states, which account
for much less than a fth of the votes in the Republican convention in 1980
(Malbin, 1985). The emphasis on winning early primaries may come from the
widely-held belief that early winners gain momentumdue to the sequential
nature of the election.
However, recent primaries have become more front-loaded into the early
weeks. California has recently passed a legislation to move forward its primary
to Feb. 5, 2008, only after 4 other primaries held in January. The media in
general views this as selshbehavior on the part of those states. It has been
argued that a more front-loaded primary system makes it more important for
candidates to raise a lot of money early (William Schneider, 1997) and a more
front-loaded 2008 primary gives well-established candidates an advantage. On
what ground do these assertions stand? And if they are true, through what
channel does the timing structure a¤ect the voting outcomes?
Existing literature that study sequential elections has for the most part re-
stricted attention to contests between two candidates. However, there are
usually many candidates in a presidential primary. For example, Sen. Hillary
Rodham Clinton of New York, Sen. Barack Obama of Illinois and former sen-
ator John Edwards of North Carolina, are all considered front runners in the
2008 primary for the Democratic party. With only two candidates, voters sim-
ply vote for their preferred candidate. In a multi-candidate contest, however,
some voters have to vote strategically for their second choice if they believe
their most preferred candidate has a smaller probability of being in a close race.
Therefore, votersbeliefs about relative popularity of every candidate, and the
relative likelihood of di¤erent pivotal events, play an important role in their
decision.
Given this element of coordination in multicandidate contest under plurality
rule, it is not surprising that with common knowledge assumption of the elec-
toral situation, the voting outcome involves either a complete success or failure
of coordination. Duvergers Law (see Riker 1982) asserts that plurality rule
brings about and maintains two-party competition, because only two candi-
dates should be expected to get any vote. This represents complete success of
coordination. Most of the literature focuses on these Duvergerianequilibria,
but o¤ers no formal theory as to which two candidates should be considered
seriouscontenders. In addition, it cannot explain the incomplete coordina-
tion observed in many multicandidate election outcomes. For example, in the
1970 New York senatorial election, even the trailing candidate among the three
got more than 24% of the votes, and the winner gets only 2% more votes than
the second.
Moreover, common knowledge of the electoral situation seems a very strong
assumption. The 1997 British Election Survey indicates that about two-third
of voters who expected their preferred party to come second actually found that
it came third (Fisher, 2000). There was clearly lack of common knowledge
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among voters as to the identities of the rst and second place winner, which is
inconsistent with that literature.
This paper presents a model of preference aggregation in a multi-candidate
election that features a candidate who is a common second choice for sup-
porters of the other two extreme candidates. Voters in the model only have
imperfect information about the distribution of preferences in the electorate.
Supporters of an extreme candidate have an incentive to coordinate with sup-
porters of the common second choice against their least favorite candidate.
Relaxing common knowledge assumption enables meaningful analysis of this co-
ordination e¤ect. I show that this coordination incentive among supporters of
an extreme candidate is stronger when preference intensity for that candidate is
smaller, when preference intensity for the opposing extreme candidate is higher,
or when the prior belief of the share of supporters of the extreme candidate is
smaller. In addition, in those situations, there is excess coordination in that the
common second choicewins too often, i.e. sometimes the common second
choicewins even though the median voter favors one of the extreme candidates.
One interpretation of the common second choiceis a candidate thats widely
known and considered a safe option.
I then study an election that involves voting in three states (electorates) in
which the candidate winning the most states wins the election. This is close to
a Republican primary system. I compare voting behavior and outcomes under
simultaneous and sequential election. When preference intensity is not too big,
in the last state, supporters of the extreme candidate that has not garnered
any victory always vote for the common second choice. Thus the equilibrium
exhibit winnowing down of front runners. In addition, a victory by one extreme
candidate in the rst state boosts the morale of her supporters in the second
state and results in more aggressive voting behavior by her supporters and higher
chance of winning in the second state. I show that when preference intensity
is moderately small, or when the ex ante share of moderate voters is big (eg.
larger than 12 ), a sequential election reduces excess coordination motive in the
rst state as compared to the outcome under simultaneous election and reduces
the ex ante probability that the candidate winning that state is not the median
voters rst choice.
In addition to comparing voting behavior, I can also compare voting outcome
between simultaneous and sequential election. Even if sequential election does
not make extreme voters in the rst state more aggressive, if the median voter
in the rst state is extreme, then if preference intensity is moderate, she prefers
a sequential election to a simultaneous election because she can a¤ect voting
outcome in other states toward her favorite candidate. If the median voter
in the rst state is moderate, then she also prefers sequential election if the
probability that an extreme voter wins her state is at least 70% of that of the
share of extreme voters.
I can also compare voting outcome across voting order in a sequential elec-
tion. If the median voter is extreme, then she always prefers voting earlier, i.e.
rst rather than second. If the median voter is moderate, then she prefers that
her state votes rst if the other state that her state swaps voting order with is
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moderatestate, one in which preference intensity of extreme voters is small,
or ex ante share of extreme voters is small. This is because when the other state
is moderate, voting rst makes its extreme voters more aggressive, which is
bad from a moderate voters point of view.
2 Literature Review
Dekel and Piccione (2000) and Ali and Kartik (2006) both study sequential elec-
tions between two candidates in which some voters have only imperfect infor-
mation about their own preference over the two candidates. Dekel and Piccione
(2000) show that any outcome of a voting equilibrium in a simultaneous election
is also an equilibrium outcome of a sequential election with any timing structure.
Ali and Kartik (2006), on the other hand, construct a Perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium in which herding, i.e. voting according to the history of vote counts so
far and disregarding ones own information, happens with positive probability.
This suggests that in a race between two candidates, a simultaneous election
can be (but is not necessarily due to multiplicity of equilibria) more e¢ cient in
gathering information than a sequential election.
Myerson andWeber (1993) and Myerson (2002) both assume common knowl-
edge of the preference distribution of the electorate, and show that under plu-
rality rule, for any pair of candidates in a three-horse race, there exists an
equilibrium in which only this pair are considered seriousand get any vote.
Myerson (2002) call these discriminary equilibria because labeling of the can-
didates matter as to whether they have positive probability of winning. They
argue that a large multiplicity of equilibria creates a wider scope for focal
manipulation by political leaders.
Myerson and Weber (1993) also show via an example the existence of a non-
Duvergerianequilibria in which a group of voters fail completely to coordinate
to avoid the worst outcome, and the two losers exactly tie. They conjecture
that some additional assumption of dynamic stability or persistence may be
used to eliminate these non-Duvergerianequilibria.
This paper is most closely related to Myatt (2007), which studies simulta-
neous elections under plurality rule in which one candidate (the conservative
status quo) has a commonly known xed fraction (< 12 ) of supporters, while
the rest of the electorate share the distaste of the status quo but disagree on
which of the other two (liberal) candidates is optimal. This assumption ef-
fectively reduces an election under plurality rule with three candidates to one
under qualied-majority rule between two candidates. Essentially, the (liberal)
voters have to coordinate behind the two (liberal) candidates. They relax the
common knowledge assumption by assuming that each voter gets an imperfect
signal about the preference distribution of the electorate (as evident in the UK
General Election of 1997). They construct a uniqe symmetric equilibrium that
is consistent with the 1970 New York Senatorial election, which displays limited
strategic voting and incomplete coordination. However, the assumption of a
xed and commonly known support for one candidate does not seem to t US
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Presidential primaries.
It is di¢ cult to characterize equilibria in a large election because probabil-
ity ratios of close-race events between di¤erent pairs of candidates can be quite
intractable. Myatt (2007) develops the solution concept of strategic-voting equi-
librium for large elections, which can be viewed as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
with a continuum of voters. It facilitates the calculation through law of large
numbers arguments. Myerson (2000), on the other hand, tackels this issue by
assuming population uncertainty. They assume that voter turnout follows a
Poisson process with a commonly known preference distribution. The feature
of Poisson process that an individual voters belief about the behavior of the
electorate does not depend on his own preference type facilitates comparison of
limiting probabilities of di¤erent pivotal events as the size of the electorate goes
to innity.
On relaxing common knowledge assumptions in voting situations, Fedder-
sen and Pesendorfer (1997, 1998) use a common value model for jury decision
making. In their model, each juror decides on one of two votes based on a
private signal about the defendants guilt and aims to convict the guilty and
acquit the innocent. Thus other jurorsinformation matters even for a jurors
own preference over outcomes. Each juror infers about the merits of his two
actions from an assessment of the information possessed by others conditional
on his vote being pivotal. Therefore, if other jurors respond a lot to their
signals, a juror may have an incentive to disregard his own signal because the
information contained in the pivotal event outweighs his own information. This
is why bandwagon e¤ects may arise in sequential elections with two candidates
in Ali and Kartik (2006). However, since there are only two outcomes, the
coordination e¤ect in multicandidate contests is not present in these models.
3 A Multicandidate Contest in One State
3.1 The Model
Three candidates L;M;R compete in a simultaneous election. There are n
voters in the electorate where n follows a Poisson distribution with mean N .
Each voter has to voter for exactly one candidate. A voter can be of three
preference types: a right wing voter, r, prefers candidate R to M to L, a
left-wing voter, l, prefers candidate L to M to R, while a moderate voter m
prefers candidate M the most and is indi¤erent between R and L. A voter
of preference type i receives payo¤ Uij when candidate j 2 fL;M;Rg wins the
election. Write r =
UrR UrM
UrM UrL . It represents the preference intensity of a right
wing voter for her favorite candidate. Dene ur = log (2r). l and ul are
dened analogously.
A voter in the electorate is right-wing with probability F (   ), left-wing
with probability F (    ) and moderate with probability 1   F (   )  
F (    ), where F is the cumulative distribution function for Laplace dis-
tribution with mean 0 and variance 2.  is an exogenously given parameter of
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the model and in a way measures the size of the moderate population. Because
preferences are single-peaked, we can dene median voter to be the supporter of
the Condorcet winner. The median voter is moderate if  2 ( ; ), right-wing
if  >  and left-wing if  <  .
A voter does not know the ideology of the median voter in her electorate.
That is, a voter in the electorate does not know . She believes that  
Laplace (0; ). Let G (:) and g (:) denote the cumulative distribution function
and the probability density function of the prior. In addition to the common
prior about , voter i gets some additional information about the preference
of the electorate. She obtains a signal ^i 2 Laplace (; 1) independent of her
preference type. Based on her information and the prior, she then forms an
updated belief about . Denote by f (:j^i) the probability density function of
voter is posterior given her signal ^i.
3.2 Sincere Voting and Coordination Failure
If every voter simply votes for his favorite candidate, then in a large election,
vote share of candidate C, denoted by pc (), is almost equal to the probability
that voter is of type c. If 2F ( ) < 23 , when the share of two exreme voters are
equal to each other, it is smaller than the share of moderate voters. Because
pR () increases with , and pR () = 12 , the median voter preferes R to M if
and only if  > . However, when  is close to  but smaller than , R still gets
almost half of the votes, while M and L share the other half. Thus R wins the
election even though the median voter is moderate and the majority prefer M
to R. This happens because left-wing voters and moderates fail to coordinate
with each other and support M together against R. I call this cross-camp
coordination failure.
3.3 Equilibria
3.3.1 Strategies and best responses
A voters type is her ideology-information pair (oi; ^i) where oi 2 fl;m; rg and
^i 2 R. A pure strategy for voter i is then a mapping from her type to the set of
candidates fL;M;Rg. A sincere voting strategy simply chooses the candidate
thats most preferred according to voter is ideology.
There are many equilibria in this game. For example, if every voter votes
for candidate j, then a voter is never pivotal and thus she is indi¤erent between
all candidates. Given any two candidates c1; c2, there is an equilibrium in
which every voter votes for the one in fc1; c2g that she prefers. In such an
equilibrium, the election is reduced to a binary voting game. One can say that
the two candidates c1 and c2 are the front-runners and the focal point of the
election. However, the model cannot answer the question of how front runners
are chosen.
For these reasons, we focus on Bayesian Nash equilibria in type-dependent
strategies. In particular, we focus on equilibria in symmetric pure voting strate-
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gies where the same type-dependent voting strategy s (oi; ^i) is used by every
voter.
Consider a voters payo¤ given that voting strategy s is adopted by all the
other voters. Let xj denote the number of votes candidate j gets from everyone
other than voter 0. Then (xR; xM ; xL) is a vector of random variables whose
distribution depend on the voting strategy v adopted by everyone else. If
voter 0 is moderate, then it is her best response to vote for M regardless of
her information because she is indi¤erent between R and L. It is a strict best
response as long as Pr fxR = xM [ xM = xLj^ig > 0. If voter 0 is right-wing,
then her best response is to vote for R if
Pr fxR = xM j^ig+
1
2
Pr fjxR   xM j = 1j^ig+
1
2
Pr fxR = xLj^ig

(UrR   UrM )
 1
2
(Pr fxM = xLj^ig+ Pr fxR = xLj^ig) (UrM   UrL) ,
and to vote for M otherwise. A left-wing voters strategy is analogous. There-
fore, candidate R gets votes only from right-wing voters.
Denote by pj (jv) the probability that a voter votes for candidate j condi-
tional on  given that voting strategy v is adopted. Then
pR (jv) = F (   ) Pr f^i : v (r; ^i) = Rjg .
3.3.2 Voting in Large Electorates
We assume that the turn-out, n, follows a Poisson distribution with mean N .
Denote by sN (oi; ^i) an equilibrium voting strategy in such an electorate. We
focus on the limit of the equilibrium voting strategy sN (oi; ^i) as N !1.
Lemma 3.1 If everyone else in the electorate adopts a voting strategy such that
the probability that a voter votes for candidate c is equal to pc () when the state
variable is , and voter turn-out follows a Poisson process with mean N , then
for any d 2 f 1; 0; 1g,
lim
N!1
Pr fjxR   xM j = d and min fxR; xMg > xLj^i; pg
Pr fjxL   xM j = d and min fxM ; xLg > xRj^i; pg
=
f (Rj^i)
f (Lj^i)
jp0L (L)  p0M (L)j
jp0R (R)  p0M (R)j
,
where R is the solution to pR () = pM () and L is the solution to pL () =
pM (). In addition, if pR (^) < pM (^) for all solution ^ to pR () = pL (),
then
lim
N!1
Pr fjxR   xLj = d and min fxR; xLg > xM j^i; pg
Pr fjxj   xM j = d and min fxM ; xjg > x kj^i; pg
= 0
where j; k 2 fR;Lg and j 6= k.
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3.3.3 Equilibria Characterization
It follows that a right-wing voter votes for R if and only if
log
f (Rj^i)
f (Lj^i)
   log 2UrR   UrM
UrM   UrL   log
jp0R (R)  p0M (R)j
jp0L (L)  p0M (L)j
where f (:j^i) is a voters posterior about  given her signal ^i. Using Bayes
update, we have
log
f (Rj^i)
f (Lj^i)
=
8>>><>>>:
(R   L) + 2

0   R+L2

if ^i > R
2

^i   R+L2

+ 2

0   R+L2

if ^i 2 (L; R)
  (R   L) + 2

0   R+L2

if ^i < L
.
Similarly, a left-wing voter votes for L if and only if
  log f (Rj^i)
f (Lj^i)
  ul + log jp
0
R (R)  p0M (R)j
jp0L (L)  p0M (L)j
.
Let BRN (vN ) (oi; ^i) be a voters best response when everyone else adopts
sN when the mean of voter turnout is N . Write uR = log 2UrR UrMUrM UrL , then
limN!1BRN (vN ) (r; ^i) = R if and only if
max fmin f^i; Rg ; Lg  (1 + )
R + L
2
 0 
1
2
log
jp0R (R)  p0M (R)j
jp0L (L)  p0M (L)j
 1
2
uR
where c is the such that limN!1 (pR (cjvN )  pM (cjvN )) = 0, for c 2
fR;Lg. Let s be the limit of sN . Then by continuity, limN BRN (s) (r; ^i) =
R if and only if
max fmin f^i; Rg ; Lg  (1 + )
R + L
2
 0 
1
2
log
jp0R (R)  p0M (R)j
jp0L (L)  p0M (L)j
 1
2
uR
where c is the such that pc (cjs) = pM (cjs) > p c (cjs), for c 2 fR;Lg.
Therefore, if s is the limit of a symmetric equilibrium as N !1, then it is a
xed point of the mapping limN BRN!1.
A best response to any symmetric voting strategy prole is a cuto¤ strategy
involving an information threshold: r votes for R if ^i  a  uR2 and l votes for
L if and only if  ^i   a  uL2 . The information cuto¤ depends on the voters
preference intensity, but also on a systematic bias a. a > 0 represents a bias
toward L because the information cuto¤ is higher than preference intensity for
right wing voters, but lower than preference intensity for left-wing voters.
If everyone else adopts such a cuto¤ strategy indexed by a, then the proba-
bility that voter i votes for R is equal to
pR (; a) = F (   )F

   a+ uR
2

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and the probability that voter i votes for L is
pL (; a) = F (    )F

  + a+ uL
2

.
Because pR is increasing in  and pL is decreasing in , there exists a unique
solution ~ to pR () = pL (). For  > 32 , F ( ) < 13 . Thus pR (~) = pL (~) <
pM (~). Therefore, the probability that R ties with L for the winner becomes
innitestimally small relatively to the probability R ties with M for the winner
as N !1. Dene R (a) to be the solution to 2pR (; a)+pL (; a) = 1. Then
if everyone adopts a cuto¤ strategy sa indexed by a, the probability that voter i
votes forM is equal to the probability that voter i votes for R when  = R (a).
When the electorate is large, R ties with M for the winner at  near R (a).
Dene
a^ (a) = (1 + )
R (a) + L (a)
2
  0  
1
2
log
jp0R (R (a))  p0M (R (a))j
jp0L (L (a))  p0M (L (a))j
.
Then if a^ (a) 2  L (a) + ur2 ; R (a) + ur2 ,
lim
N!1
BRN (sa) (r; ^i) =

R if ^i  a^ (a)  ur2
M otherwise
.
If a^ (a)  L (a) + ur2 , limN!1BRN (sa) (r; ^i) = R and if a^ (a)  R (a) + ur2 ,
limN!1BRN (sa) (r; ^i) = M . Therefore, if sN is a symmetric equilibrium
where voters use their information in an electorate with mean N , limN!1 sN
is a cuto¤ strategy indexed by a where a is a xed point of a^.
We rst solve for pR (; a) = pM (; a).
Lemma 3.2 If uR + uL < 0 and  > 32 , then
R (a) = log
e + ea 
uR
2 +
p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+uL2
2
.
Proposition 1 If  > ur+ul4 , ,  <
1
4 and  > min
n
 uR+uL4 ; maxfuR;uLg2 + log 2
o
,
then there exists a unique xed point a for the mapping a^. In addition, a 
(uR   uL) < 0 and R (ur; ul; ; ) := R (a; uR; ul; ; ) > , L (ur; ul; ; ) :=
L (a
; ur; ul; ; ) <  . If the xed point a is in
   + ur2 ;    ul2  or if
ur + ul < 0, then it is a BNE for r to vote for R i¤ ^i  a   ur2 and l to vote
for L i¤  ^i   a   ul2 .
Therefore, the game has a unique symmetric equilibrium with multi-candidate
support when the average preference intensity is not too high and the stronger
intensity is not too small and when the prior is su¢ ciently di¤used. The equi-
librium involves threshold a such that a right wing voter votes for R if and
only if her information is more optimistic than the threshold a   ur2 and left
wing voters vote for L if and only if her information is more optimistic than
the threshold  a   ul2 . Therefore, a positive a imposes a higher threshold
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for r voters than for l voters. a is positive, i.e. r voters behave more conser-
vatively, if right wing preference intensity is weaker, or if prior probability of
a right wing voter is smaller than that of a left-wing voter. In addition, the
threshold decreases with preference intensity of ones own camp and increases
with preference intensity of the opposing camp.
3.4 Comparative Statics
Let c (ur; ul; ; ) = c (a
 (ur; ul; ; )) for c 2 fR;Lg.
3.4.1 Comparative Statics of Strategic Voting Equilibrium
Proposition 2 If ur+ul < 0, < 14 , and  > min
n
 ur+ul4 ; maxfur;ulg2 + log 2; 32
o
,
then
@jj (ur;ul;;)j
@uj
< 0 and
@jj (ur;ul;;)j
@uk
> 0 for j 6= k and j; k 2 fL;Rg.
R decreases with right wing voterspreference intensity ur and increases
with left-wing voters preference intensity ul. In other words, the prior proba-
bility that R wins the election increases with ur and decreases with ul. This is
true for preference intensities that are not very strong nor too weak.
When left-wing voters preference intensity ul goes up, there are two o¤-
setting e¤ects. First, this will increase the information threshold for right-wing
voters and thus decrease the probability that a right wing voter votes for R
by increasing the xed point a. On the other hand, given the same a, this
will decrease the information threshold for left-wing voters, and this will also
decrease equilibrium a. A stronger left-wing force will eat into the voter base
for M , and improves the prospect of R w.r.t. M . When ul is not too big , the
former force dominates.
R (u; u; ; ) is decreasing in u and increasing in . The ex ante probability
that over-coordination occurs, i.e. the ex ante probability that  2 (; R) or
( L; ), decreases with . Here  should be viewed as precision of private
information.
4 Sequential v.s. Simultaneous Election
4.1 Model
The electorate consists of three states, state 1,2,3, or say, NH, MI and CA. The
candidate that wins most states wins the election. In case of a tie between 2 or
3 candidates, the winner is determined by a random draw among those that tie
for the rst place. The winner within a state is determined also by plurality
rule as described in the previous section. Voter i is state k is right-wing with
probability F (k   k) and left-wing with probability F ( k   k). Every
voter shares the same prior that ks follow i:i:d: Laplace (0; k). In addition
to the common prior, voter i in state k obtains an additional signal ^i about k
where ^i  Laplace (k; 1). The independence of ks across states implies that
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there is no learning when voting takes place sequentially. This allows me to
focus on the coordination e¤ect of sequential voting. ks and ks are common
knowledge among voters in every state. Let Gk be the prior distribution of k.
Let voc denote the payo¤to voter of ideology type o in state k when candidate
c wins the election. We will look at the symmetric case where vrR = vlL >
vrM = vlM > vrL = vlR and vmM > vmL = vmR. Dene
k =
vrRk   vrMk
vrMk   vrLk
and u = log 2k. We call k the extreme voterspreference intensity for their
favorite candidate. Because right wing and left-wing voters both have preference
intensity k, the threshold a
 is 0 no matter how big k is.
4.2 Sequential Election
This section analyzes equilibria in a sequential election and illustrate the coor-
dination e¤ect. We only look at the election where  < 12 . In such elections,
coordination is important because the payo¤ di¤erence between the second and
the least favorite candidate is more than twice that of the rst and the second
favorite candidate.
4.2.1 Voting in the last state, CA
It is weakly dominant for a moderate voter to vote for M . Given any voting
strategy in which m always votes for M , the probability that candidate R ties
with L vanishes more quickly than the probability that candidate L ties with
M . Therefore, voter i only weighs between the probability of an R M tie and
the probability of an M   L tie.
When candidate L and candidate M each wins one state, then a right
wing voters payo¤ when candidate c wins the third state is given by UrR =
vrR+vrM+vrL
3 , UrM = vrM and UrL = vrL. When  < 1, UrM   UrL =
(vrR vrM ) (vrM vrL)
3 < 0. Therefore, in both an R M tie and an M   L tie,
a right wing voter prefers to vote for M . Therefore, in all weakly undominated
equilibria, a right wing voter votes for M . Thus the last state is a runo¤ be-
tween L and M . L wins the last state and the election if 3 <   and M wins
the last state and the election if 3 >  .
When candidate L andR each wins one state, ULRrR  ULRrM = urR urM+urR urL3
and UrM   UrL = urR urL+urM urL3 . Therefore, the preference intensity for
the last-state election, denoted by RL, is equal to 1. Thus, the equilibrium in
the subgame after R and L split the rst two states gives rise to the two cuto¤
points R (1; 1; ; ) and 

L (1; 1; ; ). Because  >
1+1
4 , 

R (1; 1; ; ) > .
4.2.2 Voting in the second state, MI.
In this section we will show how the cuto¤ points on MI for di¤erent voting
outcomes in state 2 depends on the voting outcome in New Hampshire, the
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rst primary. In particular, we will show that when preference intensity for
the overall election is moderate, probability that candidate R wins Michigan
increases as the winner of New Hampshire changes from L to M to R. In
particular, we will analyze how hR changes with h, where h 2 fR;M;Lg is
winner in New Hampshire and hR is the lower bound on 2 for candidate R to
win the second state.
Given the voting outcome h 2 fR;M;Lg of state 1, the nal election outcome
depends on the voting outcome of state 2 and the electoral preference of state 3,
3. Figure illustrates how the election outcome depends on the voting outcomes
of the rst two states and 3.
Consider the voting game in state 2 after candidate R wins the rst state.
State 2s voting outcome is pivotal only when M will win state 3, i.e. 3 < .
Therefore, we get UrR   UrM = GCA (CA) (vrR   vrM ), where GCA is the
cumulative distribution function of the prior on CA. But the payo¤ di¤erence
when M wins state 2 v.s. when L wins state 2 gets even smaller. Therefore,
we get
Rr =
G ()
1
2   G( ;)2   G( ;)6 (1  ) 
G(;R(1;1))
3 (1  )
= ,
where  = MI is the inherent preference intensity of extreme voters in Michigan
and G = GCA,  = CA. So a win by R boosts the preference intensity of right-
wing voters in the second state. The ratio 
R
r
 is higher the weaker the general
preference intensity is, and the less likely an extreme candidate will win state
3. Because the game is symmetric, Ll = 
R
r . 
R
r is di¤erent from the payo¤
di¤erence ratio in a simultaneous election conditional on one state being taken
by candidate R. Conditional on one state being R, a R-win or anM -win makes
a di¤erence when state 3 is taken by eitherM or L. But in a sequential election,
L never wins state 3 if R wins state 1 and state 2 is taken by either R orM . In
other words, voting outcome in the rst two states can change a left-wing state
from being taken by L to being taken by M .
Consider the voting game in state 2 after L wins the rst state. We get that
Lr =
1
2  G( ;)2 + G( ;)6 (1  ) + G(;

R(1;1))
3 (1  )
G ()
.
If M wins the rst state, Mr = . This is because L will not win California
unless L wins Michigan. Thus when comparing expected payo¤ from R being
the winner in Michigan and expected payo¤ from M being the winner, a voter
does not need to consider a M   L tie in other states. In other words, when
Michigans vote matters, winner in Michigan is winner of the election. Because
whether R or M wins Michigan matters when at least half of the population in
California is left-wing, and whether L or M wins MI matters when California is
right-wing. That the prior probability of California being left-wing or right-wing
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implies that within-state preference intensity is equal to inherent pereference
intensity.
Therefore, we see that hr increases as h changes from L to M to R. Right
wing voterspreference intensity for the voting outcome in the second state is
higher the closer the voting outcome in the rst state is to their preferred choice.
This is not surprising because when  < 1, UR   UM is highest when there is
an R   L tie, second when there is an R  M tie, but negative conditional on
an M   L tie. Conditional on R winning NH, an M   L tie between NH and
CA is ruled out, therefore boosting the payo¤ di¤erence between a victory by
R and a victory by M , while reducing the payo¤ di¤erence between a victory
by M and a victory by L. If L wins the rst state, then voting for R is very
risky: it is good in an R  L tie but bad in an M   L tie. So LR =1 if
  G ( ; ) G (; 

R (1; 1))
1 +G (;1) G (; R (1; 1))
This term is increasing in . It is su¢ cient if  < Gk ( k; k), the prior
probability that a voter in California is moderate.
Proposition 3 If u < 0, < 14 , and  > min
 u2 + log 2; 32	, then RR (u; ; ) <
MR (u; ; ) < 
L
R (u; ; ).
This follows immediately from Proposition 2 because right wing voters
within-state preference intensity increases while left-wing voterswithin-state
preference intensity decreases as the winner of New Hampshire changes from L
to M to R.
Note that RR is still greater than . So the within-camp coordination prob-
lem still exists in the primary of Michigan. But this problem is less severe when
the the camps favorite candidate wins New Hampshire and more severe when
the camps worst enemy wins New Hampshire. If we dene 
h
 as the degree
of sensitivity of Michigans within-state preference intensity w.r.t. history, then
the following proposition says that the larger moderate population in California
is, the more sensitive MIs preference intensity is to history. On the other hand,
the stronger MI extreme votersinherent preference intensity is, the more sen-
sitive their within-state preference intensity is to good news, i.e. to the history
where their favorite candidate wins NH, but the less sensitive their within-state
preference intensity is to bad news, i.e. to the history where their worst enemy
wins N.
Lemma 4.1 log 
R
 increases with both GCA (CA) and , while
log L  in-
creases with GCA (CA) but decreases with .
4.2.3 Voting in the rst state, NH
Because the nal outcome depends on the voting result in MI and CA, eg.
when M and L splits MI and CA, victory by R in NH results in a random draw
between all three candidates, while victory byM in NH results in a solid victory
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byM in the nal election, the expected payo¤ di¤erence between a victory by R
and M in NH is a linear combination of the payo¤ di¤erence from nal election
outcome between R and M and M and L, i.e. vR  vM and vM   vL. Roughly
speaking, a victory by R instead of M may change the nal winner from R to
M , fromM to L, from L toM . Because R and L are symmetric in every state,
;r =
  c;
1  c;
where
c; =
1
3P (m)F
  1; RL  13F (; R (1; 1))F  RL  F ( )F  RL ; ML 
P (m)F
 
RR;1

+ P (m)P (r) + 2P (r)P (l) + 13P (m)F
 
RL

  13F (; R (1; 1))F
 
RL

+ F
 
RR; 
M
R

P (r)
=
1
2
2
3   23 F (;

R(1;1))
P (m)   2
F(MR ;
L
R)
PL(R)
P (r)
P (m)
PR(R)
PL(R)
+ P (r)
PL(R)
+ 12   16   13
F(;R(1;1))
P (m) + 2
P (r)
PL(R)
P (r)
P (m) +
F(RR;MR )
PL(R)
P (r)
P (m)
.
Because  < 1; ;r is decreasing in c
;.
Outcome in the rst state can change outcome in the second state and/or
outcome in state 3. The reason a right-wing voter may strategically vote for
M instead of her favorite candidate R is for fear of a tie between M and L and
getting L elected instead of M in that situation. Roughly speaking, M and L
tie in the overall election when one of the other two states is moderate and the
other is left-wing. But when R wins the rst state, and M wins the second
state, no one votes for L in the third state and M will win the third state and
the nal election even if the median voter in CA is left-wing.
When  < 1, an extreme voter worry quite a lot about failing to coordinate
with a moderate state and letting L win the election. Note that for the second
state, after one victory by M , a victory by R ensures that L cannot win the
election. Therefore, for NH, if the e¤ect from changing MI from L to M is
small, then the preference intensity for NH voters is smaller than that for MI
voters when M wins NH. That is, ;R > 
M
R . But if the e¤ect of changing MI
from L to M is big, then ;R < 
M
R .
4.2.4 Why Does New Hampshire want to vote rst?
Does a median voter in NH prefer to vote rst or second in a sequential primary?
That is, does the median voter in NH prefer to vote rst or to switch order with
Michigan? This depends on the distribution of preferences in NH and MI. If
the median voter in NH and MI are both right-wing, then NHs median voter
weakly prefers the more aggressive state to vote rst. If NH and MI are ex
ante identical, conditional on the super majority in both states being of the
same camp, payo¤ does not depend on whether NH swaps order with MI. If
NH is only mildly right-wing and MI is moderate, then whether NH votes rst
or after knowing that M wins MI may change the identity of the winner in
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NH. More specically, if NH is between MR and 
;
R andM wins MI regardless
of order, then voting rst makes right-wing voters behave more aggressively if
;R < 
M
R , while voting after being assured that M wins MI makes them behave
more aggressively if ;R > 
M
R . Thus, conditional on NH being mildly right-wing
and MI being moderate, median voter in NH prefers to vote rst if and only if
;R < 
M
R .
However, if MI is of the opposite camp from NH, then the median voter in
NH denitely prefers to vote rst. This is because the winner in MI will be M
instead of L if NH votes rst and R wins NH, which makes the nal election
outcome more favorable to NHs median voter, or because NH is not right wing
enough and thus voting after MI implies voting after knowing that L has won
MI, which makes right wing voters in NH more conservative and results in a
victory by M instead of R in NH even though the super majority in NH prefers
R.
Thus if ;R > 
M
R , conditional on the median voter in NH being right wing,
whether she prefers that NH votes rst or MI votes rst depends on the relative
probability of
 
NH ; MI
 2  MR ; ;R  ;L; RR	 and  NH ; MI 2  ;R;1  ;L; RL [  ;R; LR  RL ;1	.
If the median voter in NH is moderate, then they prefer to vote rst if and
only if knowing that M wins NH tampers the behavior of extreme voters in
MI and makes a victory by M more likely. That is, if median voter in NH is
moderate, she prefers to vote rst if and only ;R < 
M
R .
Thus we can conclude that if ;R < 
M
R , expected payo¤ from voting rst is
weakly higher than that from voting second for any NH . That is, voting rst
is unambigiously better for voters in New Hampshire when ;R < 
M
R . 
;
R < 
M
R
when the e¤ect of inuencing the second states behavior is su¢ ciently large.
Thus voting rst is unambigiously better than voting second if inherent prefer-
ence intensity is small. For example, when  is smaller than the probability
of a moderate voter in California, winnowing happens in the second state and
thus winning the rst state is necessary for an extreme candidate to win the
election. Therefore, voting rst is better than second.
4.3 Simultaneous (Front-loaded) Election
The payo¤ di¤erence to voter i in state k when candidate c wins state k v.s.
candidate c0 depends on how the voting outcome in state k a¤ects the election
outcome. We will focus on symmetric equilibria in which every voter in very
state use the same voting strategy. Suppose voters in the other two states
use voting strategy s such that R wins state k if k > ~ and L wins state k
if k <  ~. Then the probability that R wins state k is G ( ~). Denote by
pF (c) the probability that candidate c wins a state. This vector of probabilities
depend on the voting strategy s employed and is determined by ~.
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UFR   UFM = PF (R)PF (M) (vcR   vcM ) + PF (R)PF (L)
(vcR   vcM ) + (vcR   vcL)
3
+PF (M)PF (L)
(vcR   vcM )  (vcM   vcL)
3
=

PF (R)P (M) +
2
3
P (R)P (L) +
1
3
P (M)P (L)

(vcR   vcM )
 PF (L)  PF (M)  PF (R) (vcM   vcL) .
Because the game is symmetric and we are looking for symmetric equilibria,
PF (R) = PF (L) and we get
F : =
UFR   UFM
UFM   UFL
=
  cF
1  cF
where
cF =
2
3P
F (M)PF (L)  23PF (R)PF (L)
2PF (R)PF (M) + 2 23PF (R)PF (L) + 2 13PF (M)PF (L)
=
1
3
 
PF (M)  PF (R)
4
3P
F (M) + 23P
F (L)
=
1
2
1  PF (R)
PF (M)
2 + P
F (L)
PF (M)
.
Note that cF is a function of ~, and thus uF is a function of u and ~.
Given that voters in the other two states use symmetric voting strategy
v characterized by ~, preference intensity for voting outcome of the state is
given by uF (u; ~). Because the game within the state is symmetric, a =
0. In this equilibrium, an extreme voter votes for her favorite candidate if
her signal ^i >  u
F (u;~)
2 . Note that when  < 1, 
F (; ~) <  if and
only if P
F (R)
PF (M)
< 1. Therefore, in a symmetric equilibrium, the cuto¤ for
R to win a state is FR (u; ; ) > 

R (u; u; ; ). Dene 
F (~;u; ; ) =
R
 
uF (u; ~) ; uF (u; ~) ; ; 

. F (~) is increasing for ~  R (u; u; ; ) and
F (R (u; u; ; )) > 

R. Dene the xed point to be 1 when F (~) > ~ for
all ~ > R (u; u; ; ). Then 
F
R is a xed point of the function. 
F
R = 1 is a
simultaneous voting equilibrium in which all voters vote for M .
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4.4 Comparison between Sequential and Simultaneous Elec-
tion
4.4.1 Voting Behavior in State 1 (NH) under sequential and front-
loaded election
Comparing ;R and 
F
R is equivalent to comparing c
; and cF . When  < 1,
;R < 
F
R if and only if c
; < cF .
Proposition 4 For  big enough (for example when P (r) < 14), or u small
enough, voters in state 1 behave more aggressively under a sequential election
than under a simultaneous election.
It amounts to nding conditions under which c; < cF . If we ignore the
e¤ect of a¤ecting other states voting behavior, we will be comparing cF with
1
3P (m)F
  1; RL
P (m)F
 
RR;1

+ P (m)P (r) + 2P (r)P (l) + 13P (m)F
 
RL
 .
Because NH voters choose without knowing the voting results of MI and CA
in both systems, expected payo¤ di¤erence between R-victory and M -victory
depends on probability of M   L tie, R   L tie and R  M tie in MI and CA.
Payo¤ di¤erence between an R-NH and M -NH is largest when R and L split
MI and CA. More importantly, an R L tie o¤set worries about an M  L tie.
The more likely an R L tie is relatively to an M  L tie, the higher preference
intensity is. Because every state is ex ante identical, the more likely an extreme
voter will win a state, the higher F is. When NH votes in a sequential primary,
an R-L tie does not happen. If MI is R and CA is won by L in a simultaneous
election, then in a sequential election, left-wing voters in CA will coordinate
with moderates and thus M will win CA instead of L, and thus an R   L tie
in simultaneous primary turns into an R  M tie in a sequential primary. If
MI is won by L and CA by R, then right-wing voters in CA coordinate with
moderates and ensure a victory by M in CA instead of R if M wins NH. Again
an R   L tie turns into an R  M tie. In other words, victory by M in NH
forces voters in CA to coordinate with moderates in CA and in a sense with
moderates in NH so thatM wins the election instead of a random draw. If this
channel is important, F > ;. This channel is important if the probability
that an extreme candidate wins a state in a simultaneous election is low.
r voters in NH worry about M   L tie. If the probability of an M   L
tie is smaller, then preference intensity is bigger. An M   L tie happens in a
sequential primary with half of the probability of that in a simultaneous primary.
This is because if MI is M and CA is L, a victory by R in NH forces left-wing
voters in CA to coordinate with moderates, which result in a sure victory by
M instead of an M  L tie. This channel increases preference intensity under
a sequential primary relative to that under a simultaneous primary.
Which channel is more important depends on whether anR L tie or an L R
is more likely or a L M tie. By symmetry, ; is higher if PF (R) < 12PF (M).
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Because voters behave too conservatively in a strategic voting equilibrium, this
is true whenever ex ante share of an extreme voter is no bigger than half of that
of a moderate voter. This explains why ;R < 
F
R when  is large.
In a sequential primary, who wins NH a¤ects voting behavior in MI and CA.
In particular, it a¤ects voting behavior in MI. In particular, victory by R in
NH makes it harder for L to win MI, thus making an L M tie less likely. This
e¤ect increases NHs preference intensity in a sequential primary. This e¤ect is
larger when intrinsic preference intensity in MI is smaller, or when the ex ante
share of extreme preference voters is smaller.
4.4.2 Comparing election winner between Simultaneous and Sequen-
tial Primary
I will consider parameters such that extreme voters in New Hampshire behave
more aggressively in a sequential election than in a simultaneous election, i.e.
 < ;R < 
F
R. In this situation, 
h
R >  for any history in both election systems.
Therefore, M always wins a state whenever M is the condorcet winner in that
state. Thus, ifM is the condorcet winner in at least two states, M will win the
election regardless of primary system. I then need to discuss only cases where
either an extreme candidate is the Condorcet winner in at least two states, or
the Condorcet winner is di¤erent in every state.
rrr: it seems straightforward that the a better system selects candidate R
more often. The Condorcet winner in state k is R if and only if k > , but the
winner in state k is R if and only if k > hR where h is either F which indicates
the simultaneous system or a history in the sequential system. R wins the elec-
tion if R wins at least two states. Because h 2 f;; R;M;RR;RM;MMg given
that k >  for every state k, hR > 
F
R. Therefore, if R wins in a simultaneous
system, R wins in a sequential system, and there are
 
NH ; MI ; CA

such that
R wins in a sequential system but M wins in a simultaneous system.
rrm or rmr or mrr: h 2 f;; R;M;RR;RM;MR;MMg.
rrl: R wins if and only if R win both r states. If R wins only one r-state
and M wins the l state, or if R wins no r-states, then M wins the election. If
R wins an r-state in simultaneous election, then R wins that state in sequential
election because hR < 
F
R for all possible histories an r state faces in a sequential
election in this case. Therefore, whenever R wins a simultaneous election, R
would win a sequential election. If R wins only one r-state and L wins the l-
state, then all three candidates tie in the election and the outcome is a random
draw among the three. Because  < 1, all voters prefer a sure victoyr by M to
a random draw among every candidate. Thus this is the worst election outcome
in this case. Because hL =  1 for h 2 fRM;MRg, when Californias vote
matters, left-wing voters there will not vote for L and L will not win California
if the rst two states are both right-wing. Therefore, a sequential election never
produces the worst outcome, a three-way tie, while a simultaneous election may.
So sequential election produces better outcome conditional on rrl.
rlr: R wins the election if and only if R win both r-states. The set of histo-
ries that an r state may face in this case is f;; RM;RL;MM;MLg. Therefore,
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if an R wins an r-state in simultaneous election, R would win in a sequential
election as well. Therefore, R wins a simultanoues election only if R wins a
sequential election. If a sequential primary results in a three-way split, then the
winner of each state in the order of voting must be RLM because R will never
win California in a sequential primary after history ML. The outcome under
sequential is worse than that under simtulaneous election if and only if the win-
ner in order under sequential is RLM while that under simultaneous is MLM .
The election outcome would change from 13R+
1
3M+
1
3L, a random draw among
all, to M when the system becomes simultaneous if
 
NH ; MI ; CA
 2
;R; 
F
R

   1; RL (; R (1)) .
This is the only parameter range in this case where the outcome under sequential
is worse than that under simultaneous. On the other hand, the outcome would
change from R to 13R +
1
3M +
1
3L when the primary becomes simultaneous if 
NH ; MI ; CA
 2 
;R; 
F
R

   1; RL  FR;1 .
Because R is the best outcome and a random draw among all is the worst, the
second e¤ect more than cancels out the rst if GCA
 
FR;1

< GCA (; 

R (1)).
Because GCA ( ; ) > 13 , this is true only if the probability that R will win
California in a simultaneous election is less than 16 or only if GCA (; 

R (1)) >
1
6 .
But then, MLM !MLR
; ;R

   1; ML   FR;1 .
This e¤ect cancels out the rst if GCA
 
;R; 
F
R

< GCA
 
FR;1

.
The only problem is whenGCA
 
FR;1

< min

GCA (; 

R (1)) ; GCA
 
;R; 
F
R
	
.
Then GCA
 
; FR

> 2GCA
 
FR;1

.
Suppose the parameters are such that extreme voters in New Hampshire
behave more aggressively in a sequential primary than a simultaneous primary.
Because M always wins a state whenever M is the condorcet winner in that
state, while there is always too much coordination cross camp other than in
the last primary in a sequential election after the camps favorite candidate
splits with M , conditional on the median voter in every state supports the
same candidate, the universally favored candidate is the winner with higher
probability in a sequential election than in a simultaneous election. In addition,
sequential primary facilitates coordination across camp across states and thus a
three-way split between all candidates is less likely to happen under a sequentail
primary. When  < 1, every voter prefers a sure victory by M than a random
draw among all candidates. Thus every voter prefers a sequential primary
conditional on the simultanoues primary outcome being a three-way split. In
general, if the median voter in two states support the same candidate, then
sequential primary is preferred unless the candidate most preferred by median
19
voters in the last two states, MI and CA, is an extreme candidate, say R,
and the median voter in the NH supports the other extreme candidate, say
L. In the latter situation, the eventual winner may be M instead of R if MI
is the probability of right-wing voter is not high enough. This is due to the
disproportionate impact of the winner in NH in a sequential primary.
4.4.3 For NH  Sequential or Simultaneous?
If voters in NH behave more aggresively in a sequential election, then if the
median voter in NH is extreme, he must prefer sequential primary to simulta-
neous primary. In fact, even if voting behavior is less aggressive in a sequential
election, as long as the di¤erence is small, if median voter in NH is extreme, he
still prefers sequential primary. This is because the voting outcome in NH may
change voting outcome in MI and/or CA toward NHs median voters preferred
candidate. For example, if 1 > max

FR; 
;
R
	
, then the voting outcome in
NH is R regardless of primary system. This makes it harder for L to win MI
than if the primary system is simultaneous. If MI < RL , then moving to
a sequential primary changes the voting outcome in MI from L to M , which
futher changes voting outcome in CA from L to M thus nal winner from L to
M if CA < FL . Suppose 2 is such that outcome in MI does not depend on
primary system either. Then it changes CAs voting outcome from L toM and
nal election outcome from a random draw among all three to M if CA < FL
and the primary system is sequential intead of simultaneous.
If in addition to the e¤ect of changing voting outcome in MI and/or CA
from L to M or from M to R, voting behavior in NH is more aggressive in a
sequential primary, then moving to a sequential primary changes winner in NH
from M to R if NH 2  ;R; FR. That r voters in NH vote for R with positive
probability in equilibrium indicates that expected payo¤ if R wins NH is higher
than that if M wins NH.
If the median voter in NH is moderate, then the median voter prefers se-
quential primary if and only if
F
 
FL
2   F  FL ; F  ML   F  FL ; ML F  FL > 0.
This holds if
F
 
FL

>
 
1 +
p
2

2 +
p
2
F ( ) .
So if voters dont behave too conservatively in a simultaneous election, then if
NHs median voter is moderate, he prefers sequential election. In a sequential
election, the e¤ect of forcing forcing left-wing voters to coordinate with NHs
moderates when R wins MI makes sequential election preferable to a moderate
voter in NH. However, if both MI and CA are extreme on the same side,
eg. both left-wing, then left-wing voters in CA are much more aggressive in a
sequential election because they are now sure of an M   L tie. In addition,
extreme voters in MI behave more aggressively when then know that M wins
NH. This increases the probability of a nal victory by an extreme candidate if
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the primary system is sequential. Which one is better for a moderate median
voter depends on which happens with higher probability.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies preference aggregation in a multi-candidate contest when the
preference of the electorate is not common knowledge. In a multi-candidate
contest, voters have an incentive to coordinate with supporters of their second
choice to avoid a victory by the least favorite candidate. I show that the coor-
dination incentive is stronger when preference intensity is weaker. I then use
this model as cornerstone to compare a simultaneous election in which several
states vote at the same time and a sequential election in which each state votes
one by one after observing outcomes of previous states. I show that when the
prior probability of extreme voters is small or when the preference intensity of
extreme voters is small, coordination incentives are stronger for extreme voters
and thus they vote more aggressively in a sequential election than in a simulta-
neous election. As a result, the prior probability that the winner in a state is
not the rst choice of the median voter is smaller in a sequential election.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof for lemma 3.1.
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that
lim
N!1
N Pr fVR = VM > VLj^i; pg =
f (Rj^i)
jp0R (R)  p0M (R)j
.
Let
Hu = f(VR; VM ; VL) jVR = VM > VL where Vc  0 for c = R;M;Lg
Then
Pr fVR = VM > VLj^i; pg =
Z 1
= 1
P (HujN; p ()) f (j^i) d.
Let
H = f(VR; VM ; VL) jVR = VM where Vc  0 for c = R;M;Lg
and H = f(VR; VM ; VL) jVR = VM where Vc  0 for c = R;M;Lg. Then H is
a hyperplane in (N [ f0g)3 spanned by w1 = (1; 1; 0) and w2 = (0; 0; 1).
Given , we rst show that yN :=
h
N
p
pR () pM ()
i
;
h
N
p
pR () pM ()
i
; [NpL ()]

is a near maximizer
P
c pc 

x(c)
Npc

over x in H where  () =  (1  log )  1.
H = f (1; 1; 0) + j (0; 0; 1) j  0 and j  0g. Let
(; j) 2 arg max
0;j0

pR 


NpR

+ pM 


NpM

+ pL 

j
NpL

.
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Because the derivative is 1 for  = 0 or j = 0 and the function goes to 0 as
 or j ! 1, the solution must be interior of H. Thus ; j satisfy the rst
order condition:
0 =   log 
NpR
  log 
NpM
0 =   log j
NpL
.
So  = N
p
pRpM and j = NpL. Then yN as dened is a near maximizer.
pR 


NpR

+ pM 


NpM

+ pL 

j
NpL

= pR


NpR

1  log


NpR

  1

+pM


NpM

1  log


NpM

  1

+pL

j
NpL

1  log

j
NpL

  1

=  1 + 

N

1  log


NpR

+ 1  log


NpM

+
j
N

1  log

j
NpL

=  1 + 2

N
+
j
N
= 2
p
pRpM   (1  pL)
= 2
p
pRpM   pR   pM
=   (ppR  ppM )2 .
Then using theorem 3 in Myerson (2000),
lim
N!1
Pr fHjNp ()g
Pr fyN jNp ()g (2) (det (M (yN ))) 0:5
= 1
whereM (yN ()) =
" 2h
N
p
PR()pM ()
i 0
0 1[NpL()]
#
and limN!1N M (yN ) =
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"
2p
PR()pM ()
0
0 1pL()
#
. By Myerson (2000),
Pr fyN jNp ()g  e
N

pR 


NpR

+pM 


NpM

+pL 

j
NpL

c2fR;M;Lg
p
2yN (c)
=
e N(
p
pR ppM)2
(2)
3
2
q
()2 j
=
e N(
p
pR ppM)2
(2N)
3
2
p
pRpMpL
.
(det (M (yN )))
 0:5 

1
N2
p
pRpMpL
 0:5
= N
qp
pRpMpL.
So
Pr fHjNp ()g  Pr fyN jNp ()g (2) (det (M (yN ))) 0:5
 N
qp
pRpMpL (2)
e N(
p
pR ppM)2
(2N)
3
2
p
pRpMpL
=
e N(
p
pR ppM)2
p
2N
pp
pRpM
.
Given " > 0, let  be such that jpR ()  pM ()j  " for all  such that
j   Rj  . Dene  := f : j   Rj < g. Then want to show that
limN!1
PrfHjNp()g
Pr(HjNp()) = 1 for  2 . Then show that limN!1N Pr fHjNp ()g =
0 for  =2 . Then
lim
N!1
N Pr fVR = VM > VLj^i; pg
= lim
N!1
N
Z

Pr fHjNp ()g f (j^i) d
= lim
N!1

N
Z
2
Pr fHjNp ()g f (j^i) d +N
Z
=2
Pr fHjNp ()g f (j^i) d

= lim
N!1
N
Z
2
Pr fHjNp ()g f (j^i) d + lim
N!1
N
Z
=2
Pr fHjNp ()g f (j^i) d.
lim
N!1
N
Z
=2
Pr fHjNp ()g f (j^i) d
 lim
N!1
Z
=2
N Pr fHjNp ()g f (j^i) d
= 0.
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And
N
Z
2
Pr fHjNp ()g f (j^i) d
2
2664
p
2f (Rj^i)rq
pM (R)
pR(R)
p0R (R) 
rq
pR(R)
pM (R)
p0M (R)
  ;
p
2f (Rj^i)rq
pM (R)
pR(R)
p0R (R) 
rq
pR(R)
pM (R)
p0M (R)
+ 
3775

Z
2
N
0BB@
p
2rq
pM
pR
p0R () 
rq
pR
pM
p0M ()
1CCA
 1
Pr fHjNp ()g d
=
" p
2f (Rj^i)
p0R (R)  p0M (R)
  ;
p
2f (Rj^i)
p0R (R)  p0M (R)
+ 
#

Z
2
N
0BB@
p
2rq
pM
pR
p0R () 
rq
pR
pM
p0M ()
1CCA
 1
Pr fHjNp ()g d
Z
2
N Pr fHjNp ()g d
=
Z R+"
=R "
p
Ne
 N
p
pR() 
p
pM ()
2
p
2
qp
pR () pM ()
d.
Write x =
p
2N
p
pR () 
p
pM ()

. Then
dx =
p
2N
p
pM ()p
0
R () 
p
pR ()p
0
M ()
2
p
pRpM
d
=
p
N
rq
pM
pR
p0R () 
rq
pR
pM
p0M ()
p
2
pp
pRpM
d
Z
2
N Pr fHjNp ()g d
=
Z p2NppR(R+") ppM (R+")
x=
p
2N
p
pR(R ") 
p
pM (R ")

p
2rq
pM
pR
p0R () 
rq
pR
pM
p0M ()
1p
2
e 
x2
2 dx.
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Then
lim
N!1
Z
2
N
0BB@
p
2rq
pM
pR
p0R () 
rq
pR
pM
p0M ()
1CCA
 1
Pr fHjNp ()g d
= lim
N!1
Z p2NppR(R+") ppM (R+")
x=
p
2N
p
pR(R ") 
p
pM (R ")
 1p
2
e 
x2
2 dx
= 1.
Let  ! 0. Then we get limN!1N Pr fVR = VM > VLj^i; pg =
p
2f(Rj^i)
p0R(R) p0M (R) .
Need
p
2f(j^i)sr
pM ()
pR()
p0R() 
sr
pR()
pM ()
p0M ()
to be absolutely continuous:
6.2 Additional proofs and lemmas for Section3.3.3
Lemma 6.1 If  > log 32 , then pR (~; s) < pM (~; s) if pR (~; s) = pM (~; s)
where pc (; s) is the probability that a voter using strategy s votes for candidate
c.
Proof. Let Fc () denote the probability that a voters favorite candidate
is c. Then FM (0) = 1   2F ( ) = 1   e  > 13 and FR (0) = FL (0) = 13 .
In addition, FM ()   FL () rst increases and then decreases on ( 1; 0] and
FM (0) > FL (0) because for  < ( ; 0),
@ (FM ()  FL ())
@
=
@
@

1  e     1
2
e ( )

= e 

e    1
2
e

which is positive i¤  <   log 22 . For  <  ,
FM ()  FR () = 1
2
e+   e  = e 

1
2
e2   1

which is positive because e > 32 . So for all , FM () > min fFR () ; FL ()g.
Because an extreme candidate can only get votes from its supporters, given
any voting strategy, pc (; s)  Fc () for c = R;L and pM (; s)  FM (). If
pR (~; s) = pL (~; s), then pR (~; s) = min fpR (~; s) ; pL (~; s)g  min fFR (~) ; FL (~)g <
FM (~).
Lemma 6.2 If  > uR+uL4 , then R (a) > max

; a  uR2
	
and L (a) <
min
 ; a+ uL2 	.
Proof. We rst observe that 2pR (; a) + pL (; a) is increasing in .
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Case 1  < a  ~uR2 . Suppose to the contrary that R 2

; a  ~uR2

, then
2p0R () + p
0
L ()
=
1
2
e +e a+
~uR
2 +

1  1
2
e ( )

e

 a+ ~uR2

 1
2
e  

F

  + a+ ~uL
2

+ f

  + a+ uL
2

> e a+
~uR
2   1
2
e  
( * F (x) + f (x)  1 for all x)
and 2p00R () + p
00
L () > 0 for all  2
 
; a  uR2

. Thus the maximum of
2pR () + pL () on

; a  uR2

is attained at either  =  or  = a  uR2 . But
2pR

a  ~uR
2

+ pL

a  ~uR
2

  1
  1
2
e a+
~uR
2 +
1
2
e  a+
~uR
2 < 0,
and
2pR () + pL ()  1
=
1
2
e a+
uR
2 +
1
2
e 2F

  + a+ uL
2

  1
<
1
2
+
1
2
e 2   1 < 0.
Thus 2pR (R) + pL (R)  1 < 0, contradiction.
Case 2 a  uR2  . In this case,
2p0R () + p
0
L ()
= e    1
2
e  

F

  + a+ ~uL
2

+ f

  + a+ ~uL
2

> e    1
2
e   > 0
for all  > 0 because F (x) + f (x)  1 for all x (
F (x) + f (x) =

1  12e x + 12e x = 1 if x > 0
1
2e
x + 12e
x = ex < 1 if x < 0
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. Suppose to the contrary that R 2

a  ~uR2 ; 

. Because R > 0 >  , then
0 = 2pR (R) + pL (R)  1
=

1  1
2
e +a 
~uR
2

e  +
1
2
e R F

  + a+ ~uL
2

  1
 2pR () + pL ()  1
  1
2
e +a 
~uR
2 +
1
2
e  
1
2
e +a+
uL
2
(this is because 1  1
2
e x is smaller than
1
2
ex for x greater than 0)
< 0
if a  uR2 >  2+ a+ uL2   log 2, i.e.  > uR+uL4   log 2. Thus a contradiction
because we assume  > uR+uL4 .
Lemma 6.3 If  > uR+uL4 , then
p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL > max

e+ea 
uR
2
2 ;
e   ea uR2 
Proof.
4
q
e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2
2
 

ea 
uR
2 + e
2
= 3
 
e2 + e2a ~uR
  4ea + ~uL2   2ea uR2 +
= 3

ea 
uR
2   e
2
+ 4

ea 
uR
2 +   ea + ~uL2

 0
if uR+uL2 < 2.
Lemma 6.4 For a such that max

; a  uR2
	
> a+uL2 and max

; a  uL2
	
>
 a+ uR2 ,
^R (a) = log

1
2
e +
1
2
ea 
1
2uR +
1
2
q
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL

,
and
^L (a) =   log

1
2
e +
1
2
e a 
1
2uL +
1
2
q
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR

,
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and
a^ (a)
=

1 +

2
24 log e + ea  12uR +pe2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
  log

e + e a 
1
2uL +
p
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
 35
 1
2
"
log
p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
  log
p
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
#
  0
Proof. Suppose R > max

; a  12 ~uR; a+ ~uL2
	
and L < min
 ; a+ uL2 ; a  uR2 	,
then R is the solution to
1 = 2

1  1
2
e (R )

1  1
2
e
 

R a+ ~uR2

+
1
2
e R 
1
2
e R+a+
~uL
2 .
So
eR =
1
2
e +
1
2
ea 
1
2uR +
1
2
q
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL .
By symmetry,
e L =
1
2
e +
1
2
e a 
1
2uL +
1
2
q
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR .
If  > uR+uL4 , then for a <    uL2 ,
R (a) = log

1
2
e +
1
2
ea 
1
2uR +
1
2
q
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL

> max
n
; a  uR
2
; a+
uL
2
o
.
Suppose R > max
n
; a  12 ~uR
o
. Then
p0R (R) = (1  F (R   ))F

R   a+
~uR
2

+ F (R   )

1  F

R   a+
1
2
~uR

= F

R   a+
~uR
2

+ F (R   )  2pR (R) .
If R > max
 ; a+ ~uL2 	, then
p0L (R) =  2pL (R) .
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So if R > max

; a  12 ~uR; a+ ~uL2
	
, then
p0R (R)  p0M (R)
= 2p0R (R) + p
0
L (R)
= 2F

R   a+
~uR
2

+ 2F (R   )  4pR (R)  2pL (R)
= 2F

R   a+
~uR
2

+ 2F (R   )  2
= 1  e 

R a+ ~uR2

+ 1  e (R ) 2 (0; 2)
= e R

2eR   e   ea uR2

= e R
q
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL .
So
jp0R (R)  p0M (R)j
jp0L (L)  p0M (L)j
=
1  e R+a  ~uR2 + 1  e (R )
1  eL a  12 ~uL + 1  eL 
=
2eR 

ea 
uR
2 +e

eR
2e L 

e a 
uL
2 +e

e L
= e R L
p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uLp
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
.
We thus get a^ (a) but substituting these expressions into
a^ (a) = (1 + )
R + L
2
  0  
1
2
log
jp0R (R)  p0M (R)j
jp0L (L)  p0M (L)j
.
Lemma 6.5 If  > uR+uL4 , then for a such that max

; a  uR2
	
> a+ uL2 and
max

; a  uL2
	
>  a+ uR2 ,
a^0 (a) =
1
2
+
1
2
ea 
uR
2   ep
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
0@1  e+ea uR22p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
1A
+
1
2
e a 
uL
2   ep
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
0@1  e+e a uL22p
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
1A
+

2
 
1 +
1
2
ea 
uR
2   ep
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
+
1
2
e a 
uL
2   ep
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
!
.
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Proof. From lemma, because  > uR+uL4 , we have R (a) > max

; a  ur2
	
and  L (a) <  max

; a  ul2
	
.
Again, if R >
n
; a  12 ~uR; a+ ~uL2
o
, then
@pR (R; a)
@a
=  F (R   ) + pR (R)
@pL (R; a)
@a
= pL (R) .
So
@R (a)
@a
=  2
@pR(R;a)
@a +
@pL(R;a)
@a
2p0R (R) + p
0
L (R)
=
2F (R   )  1
1  e R+a  ~uR2 + 1  e (R )
=
1  e (R )
1  e R+a  ~uR2 + 1  e (R )
2 (0; 1)
=
1
2
ea 
uR
2   e +
p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uLp
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
=
1
2
 
1 +
ea 
uR
2   ep
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
!
because R (a) > max

a  uR2 ; 
	
. I have checked that this expression is equal
to
@R (a)
@a
=
ea 
uR
2 + 2e
2a uR e +a+
uL
2
2
q
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uL
ea 
uR
2   e +
p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
.
Because
jp0R (R)  p0M (R)j
jp0L (L)  p0M (L)j
=
1  e R+a  ~uR2 + 1  e (R )
1  eL a  12 ~uL + 1  eL  ,
@
@a
log
jp0R (R)  p0M (R)j
jp0L (L)  p0M (L)j
=

e R+a 
~uR
2 + e (R )

@R
@a   e R+a 
~uR
2
1  e R+a  ~uR2 + 1  e (R )
 
 

eL a 
1
2 ~uL + eL+

@L
@a + e
L a  12 ~uL
1  eL a  12 ~uL + 1  eL 
=

e + ea 
uR
2

@R
@a   ea 
uR
2p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
+

e + e a 
uL
2

@L
@a   e a 
uL
2p
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
.
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So
a^0 (a) =
1
2
(1 + )

@R
@a
+
@L
@a

  1
2
@
@a
log
jp0R (R)  p0M (R)j
jp0L (L)  p0M (L)j
=
1
2
24 ea uR2p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
+
0@1 +  

e + ea 
uR
2

p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
1A @R
@a
35
+
1
2
24 e a uL2p
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
+
0@1 +  

e + e a 
uL
2

p
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
1A @L
@a
35
=
1
2
266664
ea 
uR
2q
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uL
+0@1 +  

e+ea 
uR
2

q
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uL
1A 1
2
 
1 + e
a uR
2  eq
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uL
!
377775
+
1
2
[]L
=
1
2
266666664
1+
2
+ e
a uR
2q
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uL
  12

e+ea 
uR
2

q
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uL
+ 12
ea 
uR
2  eq
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uL
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 

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uR
2

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1A
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1
2
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2 +
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2
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uR
2  eq
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+ 12
ea 
uR
2  eq
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uL
0@1 +  

e+ea 
uR
2

q
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uL
1A
377775+ []L
=
1
2
2664
1+
2
+ 12
ea 
uR
2  eq
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uL
0@2 +  

e+ea 
uR
2

q
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uL
1A
3775+ []L
=
1
2
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1+
2
+ e
a uR
2  eq
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uL
 
1 + 2  
e+e
a uR
2
2q
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uL
! 375+ []L
=
1 + 
2
+
1
2
ea 
uR
2   ep
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
0@1 + 
2
 
e+ea 
uR
2
2p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
1A
+
1
2
e a 
uL
2   ep
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
0@1 + 
2
 
e+e a 
uL
2
2p
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
1A
=
1
2
+
1
2
ea 
uR
2   ep
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
0@1  e+ea uR22p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
1A
+
1
2
e a 
uL
2   ep
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
0@1  e+e a uL22p
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
1A
+

2
 
1 +
1
2
ea 
uR
2   ep
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
+
1
2
e a 
uL
2   ep
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
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Becausemax
ea uR2   e ; ea uR2 +e2  <pe2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL and
max
e a uL2   e ; e a uL2 +e2  < pe2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR , a^0 (a) > 0
for all a and a^0 (a) < 1 for  su¢ ciently small.
Therefore, for  su¢ ciently small, a^0 (a) < 1 if uR + uL < 0 or for all
a 2    + uR2 ;    uL2 . Let a denote a xed point of a^.
Observation log
q
e2a uR+e2 ea+
uL
2
 q
e 2a uL+e2 e a+
uR
2
 
log

ea 
uR
2 +e


e a 
uL
2 +e
 > 0 if  > 34 (uR + uL) 
log 2.
Proof.q
e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2  
q
e2 + e 2a ~uL   e a + ~uR2
=
e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2  

e 2a ~uL   e a + ~uR2

q
e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2 +
q
e2 + e 2a ~uL   e a + ~uR2
=
e2a ~uR   e 2a ~uL  

ea +
~uL
2   e a + ~uR2

q
e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2 +
q
e2 + e 2a ~uL   e a + ~uR2
=

ea 
uR
2   e a uL2

ea 
uR
2 + e a 
uL
2

 

ea 
uR
2   e a uL2

e +
uR+uL
2q
e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2 +
q
e2 + e 2a ~uL   e a + ~uR2
=

ea 
uR
2   e a uL2
 ea uR2 + e a uL2   e +uR+uL2q
e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2 +
q
e2 + e 2a ~uL   e a + ~uR2
.
And
ea 
uR
2 + e a 
uL
2   e +uR+uL2q
e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2 +
q
e2 + e 2a ~uL   e a + ~uR2
 2e
 uR+uL4   e +uR+uL2q
e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2 +
q
e2 + e 2a ~uL   e a + ~uR2
> 0
if  > 34 (uR + uL)  log 2.
Observation If  <  uR+uL4 , then
log
q
e2a uR+e2 ea+
uL
2
 q
e 2a uL+e2 e a+
uR
2
 
 >
log

ea 
uR
2 +e


e a 
uL
2 +e


and log
q
e2a uR+e2 ea+
uL
2
 q
e 2a uL+e2 e a+
uR
2
 
log

ea 
uR
2 +e


e a 
uL
2 +e
 > 0. If  > max uR+uL4 ; 34 (uR + uL)	,
32
then
log
q
e2a uR+e2 ea+
uL
2
 q
e 2a uL+e2 e a+
uR
2
 
 <
log

ea 
uR
2 +e


e a 
uL
2 +e

.
Proof.  p
e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2  p
e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2  
!2
 

ea 
uR
2 + e
2

e a 
uL
2 + e
2
=
e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2  
e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2    
e2a uR + e2 + 2ea 
uR
2 +
e 2a uL + e2 + 2e a 
uL
2 +
=

ea 
uR
2   e a uL2

1  e2+uR+uL2

2e 
uR+uL
2 + e 


e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2  

e 2a uL + e2 + 2e a 
uL
2 +
 .
If  <  uR+uL4 , then either
 q
e2a uR+e2 ea+
uL
2
 q
e 2a uL+e2 e a+
uR
2
 
!2
>

ea 
uR
2 +e
2

e a 
uL
2 +e
2 > 1
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2  e a uL2 > 0 or
 q
e2a uR+e2 ea+
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2
 q
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uR
2
 
!2
<

ea 
uR
2 +e
2

e a 
uL
2 +e
2 <
1 because ea 
uR
2  e a uL2 < 0. So
log
q
e2a uR+e2 ea+
uL
2
 q
e 2a uL+e2 e a+
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2
 
 >
log

ea 
uR
2 +e


e a 
uL
2 +e


and log
q
e2a uR+e2 ea+
uL
2
 q
e 2a uL+e2 e a+
uR
2
 
log

ea 
uR
2 +e


e a 
uL
2 +e
 > 0. If  > max uR+uL4 ; 34 (uR + uL)	,
then either

ea 
uR
2 +e
2

e a 
uL
2 +e
2 >
 q
e2a uR+e2 ea+
uL
2
 q
e 2a uL+e2 e a+
uR
2
 
!2
> 1 when ea 
uR
2  
e a 
uL
2 > 0 or

ea 
uR
2 +e
2

e a 
uL
2 +e
2 <
 q
e2a uR+e2 ea+
uL
2
 q
e 2a uL+e2 e a+
uR
2
 
!2
< 1 when ea 
uR
2  
e a 
uL
2 < 0.
Observation
0@ ea uR2 +e2q
e2a uR+e2 ea+
uL
2
 
 

e a 
uL
2 +e
2
q
e 2a uL+e2 e a+
uR
2
 
1Aea uR2   e a uL2  >
0 if  > log 32 .
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Proof.0B@

ea 
uR
2 + e
2
p
e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2  
1CA
2
 
0B@

e a 
uL
2 + e
2
p
e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2  
1CA
2
=
1
e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2  

e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2  


8><>:

e2a uR + e2 + 2e+a 
uR
2
2 
e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2  

 

e 2a uL + e2 + 2e a 
uL
2
2 
e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2  

9>=>;
 0
after some algebra.
0B@

ea 
uR
2 + e
2
p
e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2  
1CA
2
 
0B@

e a 
uL
2 + e
2
p
e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2  
1CA
2
=
1
e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2  

e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2  


8><>:

e2a uR + e2 + 2e+a 
uR
2
2 
e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2  

 

e 2a uL + e2 + 2e a 
uL
2
2 
e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2  

9>=>; .
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8><>:

e2a uR + e2 + 2e+a 
uR
2
2 
e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2  

 

e 2a uL + e2 + 2e a 
uL
2
2 
e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2  

9>=>;
= e2
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
e2
0@ e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2    e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2  
+

e2a uR ++e2 + 2e+a 
uR
2

 

e 2a uL ++e2 + 2e a 
uL
2
 1A
+e uR uL   e uR uL
 ea uR+uR2   + e a uL+uL2  
+2e a 
uR
2  uL   2e+a uL2  uR
 2 + 2
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
+
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
e2
0@ e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2   e2a uR   e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2   e 2a uL
+

e2a uR ++e2 + 2e+a 
uR
2

e2a uR  

e 2a uL ++e2 + 2e a 
uL
2

e 2a uL
1A
+e uR uLe2a uR   e uR uLe 2a uL
 ea uR+uR2  e2a uR + e a uL+uL2  e 2a uL
+2e a 
uR
2  uLe2a uR   2e+a uL2  uRe 2a uL
 2e2a uR + 2e 2a uL
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
+
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
e2
0@ e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2   2ea uR2 +   e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2   2e a uL2 +
+

e2a uR ++e2 + 2e+a 
uR
2

2ea 
uR
2 +  

e 2a uL ++e2 + 2e a 
uL
2

2e a 
uL
2 +
1A
+e uR uL2ea 
uR
2 +   e uR uL2e a uL2 +
 ea uR+uR2  2ea uR2 + + e a uL+uL2  2e a uL2 +
+2e a 
uR
2  uL2ea 
uR
2 +   2e+a uL2  uR2e a uL2 +
 2  2ea uR2 + + 2  2e a uL2 +
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
rst bracket
= e2
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
e2
0@ e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2    e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2  
+

e2a uR ++e2 + 2e+a 
uR
2

 

e 2a uL ++e2 + 2e a 
uL
2
 1A
+e uR uL   e uR uL
 ea uR+uR2   + e a uL+uL2  
+2e a 
uR
2  uL   2e+a uL2  uR
 2 + 2
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= e2
8>>><>>>:
e2

2e

ea 
uR
2   e a uL2

+ e +
uR+uL
2

ea 
uR
2   e a uL2

 e 

ea 
uR
2   e a uL2

 2e uR+uL2

ea 
uR
2   e a uL2

9>>>=>>>;
= e2

ea 
uR
2   e a uL2

2e3 + e+
uR+uL
2   e    2e uR+uL2

.
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=
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
e2
0@ e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2   e2a uR   e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2   e 2a uL
+

e2a uR + e2 + 2e+a 
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2

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
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
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
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
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
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=
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
e2
0@ e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2   2ea uR2 +   e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2   2e a uL2 +
+

e2a uR + e2 + 2e+a 
uR
2

2ea 
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
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+e uR uL2ea 
uR
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2  uL2ea 
uR
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= 2e2
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
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uR
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
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
ea 
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2   e a uL2

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
ea 
uR
2   e a uL2
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
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+2
0BBBBB@
e uR uL

ea 
uR
2   e a uL2

 

ea 
uR
2   e a uL2
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
ea 
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
1CCCCCA
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
ea 
uR
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8>><>>:
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
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
+

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uR
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9>>=>>; .
37
So
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2   e a uL2

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e2
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2e3 + e+
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
+
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
ea 
uR
2
3
+

e a 
uL
2
3
+

e2a uR + e 
uR+uL
2 + e 2a uL
  
2e3   e 
+

ea 
uR
2 + e a 
uL
2

2e4 + 2e2 
uR+uL
2 + e (uR+uL)   2

+2e uR uL   e
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
+2
8>><>>:
e

e2a uR + e 
uR+uL
2 + e 2a uL

+

ea 
uR
2 + e a 
uL
2
  
2e   1
2e3 + 2e2   2e   e uR+uL2 + e uR uL
9>>=>>;
= e2

ea 
uR
2
3
+

e a 
uL
2
3
+

e2a uR + e 
uR+uL
2 + e 2a uL
  
2e3   e  + 2e
+

ea 
uR
2 + e a 
uL
2

2e4 + 2e2 
uR+uL
2 + 2e + e (uR+uL)   3

+e2

2e3 + e+
uR+uL
2   e    2e uR+uL2

+ 2e uR uL   e
+2

2e3 + 2e2   2e   e uR+uL2 + e uR uL

= e2

ea 
uR
2
3
+

e a 
uL
2
3
+

e2a uR + e 
uR+uL
2 + e 2a uL
  
2e3   e  + 2e
+

ea 
uR
2 + e a 
uL
2

2e4 + 2e2 
uR+uL
2 + 2e + e (uR+uL)   3

+2e5 + e3+
uR+uL
2   2e3 uR+uL2 + 4e3 + 4e2   6e
+4e uR uL   2e uR+uL2
= e2

ea 
uR
2
3
+

e a 
uL
2
3
+

e2a uR + e 
uR+uL
2 + e 2a uL
  
2e3   e  + 2e  2e3 uR+uL2   2e uR+uL2
+

ea 
uR
2 + e a 
uL
2

2e4 + 2e2 
uR+uL
2 + 2e + e (uR+uL)   3

+2e5 + e3+
uR+uL
2 + 4e3 + 4e2   6e + 4e uR uL
= e2

ea 
uR
2
3
+

e a 
uL
2
3
+

e2a uR + e 
uR+uL
2 + e 2a uL
   e  + e
+2e3
n
e2a uR + e 
uR+uL
2 + e 2a uL

  e uR+uL2
o
+e
n
e2a uR + e 
uR+uL
2 + e 2a uL

  2e uR+uL2
o
+

ea 
uR
2 + e a 
uL
2

2e4 + 2e2 
uR+uL
2 + 2e + e (uR+uL)   3

+2e5 + e3+
uR+uL
2 + 4e3 + 4e2   6e + 4e uR uL
 0
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if e  + e > 0 and 2e4 + 2e + e (uR+uL)   3 > 0 and
2e4 + e2+
uR+uL
2 + 4e2 + 4e   6 + 4e uR uL > 0.
This holds if e  < 23 .
Lemma 6.6 (a^ (a) + 0)
 
2a  uR uL2

< 0 if  > max

3
4 (uR + uL)  log 2; log 32
	
.
Proof.
a^ (a) =  0 +

2
log
ea 
uR
2 + e +
p
e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2  
e a 
uL
2 + e +
p
e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2  
+
1
2
log
24 ea uR2 + e +pe2a uR + e2   ea+uL2  
e a 
uL
2 + e +
p
e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2  
!2 p
e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2  p
e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2  
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=  0 +

2
log
ea 
uR
2 + e +
p
e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2  
e a 
uL
2 + e +
p
e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2  
+
1
2
log

ea 
uR
2 +e
2
q
e2a uR+e2 ea+
uL
2
 
+ 2

ea 
uR
2 + e

+
p
e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2  

e a 
uL
2 +e
2
q
e 2a uL+e2 e a+
uR
2
 
+ 2

e a 
uL
2 + e

+
p
e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2  
.
Because
p
e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2    
p
e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2  

ea 
uR
2   e a uL2

>
0 and
0@ ea uR2 +e2q
e2a uR+e2 ea+
uL
2
 
 

e a 
uL
2 +e
2
q
e 2a uL+e2 e a+
uR
2
 
1Aea uR2   e a uL2  >
0, it follows that
ea 
uR
2 + e +
q
e2a uR + e2   ea+uL2    

e a 
uL
2 + e +
q
e 2a uL + e2   e a+uR2  

ea 
uR
2   e a uL2

> 0
and thus
(a^ (a) + 0)

ea 
uR
2   e a uL2

> 0.
Because ea 
uR
2  e a uL2 =  2a  uR uL2  e for some  between a  ur2 and  a 
ul
2 . So (a^ (a) + 0)
 
2a  uR uL2

> 0. It follows that (a^ (0) + 0) ( uR + uL) >
0.
Observation If 34 (uR + uL)  log 2 <  <  uR+uL4 , then
ja^ (a) + 0j <
1 + 
2
log e + ea 
1
2uR +
p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
e + e a 
1
2uL +
p
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
 .
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Proof. If  > 34 (uR + uL)  log 2, then log
q
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uLq
e2+e 2a uL e  a+12uR
has the
same sign as log e
+ea 
1
2
uR
e+e a 
1
2
uL
and hence log e
+ea 
1
2
uR+
q
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uL
e+e a 
1
2
uL+
q
e2+e 2a uL e  a+12uR
.
If  <  uR+uL4 , then
log
q
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uLq
e2+e 2a uL e  a+12uR
 > log e+ea  12uRe+e a  12uL , so
log
q
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uLq
e2+e 2a uL e  a+12uR
 >log e+ea  12uR+
q
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uL
e+e a 
1
2
uL+
q
e2+e 2a uL e  a+12uR
. We have
a^ (a) + 0
=
1 + 
2
log
e + ea 
1
2uR +
p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
e + e a 
1
2uL +
p
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
+
1
2
 
log
e + ea 
1
2uR +
p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
e + e a 
1
2uL +
p
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
  log
p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uLp
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
!
.
Therefore
ja^ (a)j = 1 + 
2
log e + ea 
1
2uR +
p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
e + e a 
1
2uL +
p
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR

+
1
2
0BBBB@
log e+ea  12uR+
q
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uL
e+e a 
1
2
uL+
q
e2+e 2a uL e  a+12uR

 
log
q
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uLq
e2+e 2a uL e  a+12uR

1CCCCA
<
1 + 
2
log e + ea 
1
2uR +
p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
e + e a 
1
2uL +
p
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
 .
Observation a =2  0; uR uL4  if uR   uL > 0 and a =2  uR uL4 ; 0 if uR  
uL < 0.
Proof. Because a^ (a)
 
a  uR uL4

> 0, If 0 < a < uR uL4 , then a^ (a) < 0 <
a, so a cannot be a xed point. If  uR uL4 < a < 0, but then a^ (a) > 0 > a.
Lemma 6.7 a^0 (a) 2  0; 34 (1 + ) if  > max 34 (uR + uL)  log 2; log 32	
and either
1.  >  uR+uL4 , or
2.  >  maxfuR;uLg2 + log 2.
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Proof.
a^0 (a;uR; uL)
=
1
2
+
1
2
ea 
uR
2   ep
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
0@1  e+ea uR22p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
1A
+
1
2
e a 
uL
2   ep
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
0@1  e+e a uL22p
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
1A
+

2
 
1 +
1
2
ea 
uR
2   ep
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
+
1
2
e a 
uL
2   ep
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR
!
> 0
because 1   e
+e
a uR
2
2q
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uL
2  0; 12 and ea uR2  eq
e2+e2a uR e +a+12uL
2
( 1; 1) and
 
1  e
+e
 a uL
2
2q
e2+e 2a uL e  a+12uR
!
2  0; 12 and e a uL2  eq
e2+e 2a uL e  a+12uR
2
( 1; 1).
If either a  uR2 <  or  a  uL2 < s, then a^0 (a;uR; uL) < 12+ 14+2
 
1 + 12

=
3
4 (1 + ).
Case 3  >  uR+uL4
Proof. Then a   uR2    +
  a  uL2    < 0, so either a   uR2 <  or a  uL2 <  and a^0 (a) < 34 (1 + ).
Case 4  <  uR+uL4 .
Proof. If a =2   + uR2 ;    uL2 , then either a   uR2 <  or  a   uL2 <
. Therefore, the statement does not hold only if a 2   + uR2 ;    uL2 .
Because  2  uR + uL; uR+uL4 ,
ja^ (a)j < 1 + 
2
log e + ea 
1
2uR +
p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
e + e a 
1
2uL +
p
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR

<
1 + 
2

log 2 +
log e2a uR uL2 
because
p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL 2

0; e + ea 
1
2uR

and
p
e2 + e 2a uL   e  a+ 12uR 2
0; e + e a 
1
2uL

. Consider uR > uL. By assumption,  + uR2 > 0. Because
a =2  0; uR uL4 , if a 2   + uR2 ;    uL2  then a > uR uL4 . Because
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a^ (a)
 
a  uR uL4

> 0,
a^ (a)
<
1 + 
2

log 2 + 2a  uR   uL
2

=
1 + 
2

log 2  uR   uL
2

+ (1 + ) a
if a 2  uR uL4 ;    uL2 . If a xed point a exists in  uR uL4 ;    uL2 , then
a = a^ (a)
<
1 + 
2

log 2  uR   uL
2

+ (1 + ) a,
so
a >

1 +
1


1
2

uR   uL
2
  log 2

 uR   uL
2
  log 2 (because   1)
=
uR
2
  log 2  uL
2
>     uL
2
(because we assume that  >  max fuR; uLg
2
+ log 2),
contradiction to the hypothesis that a 2  uR uL4 ;    uL2 . The case where
uR < uL is analogous.
Lemma 6.8 a (uR   uL) < 0 if  < uR + uL,  < 14 and either
1.  >  uR+uL4 , or
2.  >  maxfuR;uLg2 + log 2.
Proof. This follows because a^0 (a) < 34 (1 + ) < 1 and a^ (0)
  uR uL2  >
0.
6.3 Proofs for Proposition 2
Lemma 6.9 @R(a;ur;ul)@a 2 (0; 1) if  > uR+uL4
Proof. Again, if R >

; a  12 ~uR; a+ ~uL2
	
, then
@pR (R; a)
@a
=  F (R   ) + pR (R)
@pL (R; a)
@a
= pL (R) .
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So
@R (a)
@a
=  2
@pR(R;a)
@a +
@pL(R;a)
@a
2p0R (R) + p
0
L (R)
=
2F (R   )  1
1  e R+a  ~uR2 + 1  e (R )
=
1  e (R )
1  e R+a  ~uR2 + 1  e (R )
2 (0; 1)
=
1
2
ea 
uR
2   e +
p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uLp
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
=
1
2
 
1 +
ea 
uR
2   ep
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
!
because R (a) > max

a  uR2 ; 
	
.
Lemma 6.10 @R(a;~uR;~uL)@~uR < 0 if  >
uR+uL
4
Proof.
@R
@uR
=  2
@pR(R;a)
@uR
+ @pL(R;a)@uR
2p0R (R) + p
0
L (R)
=  2
 
F (R   )
 
1  F  R   a+ 12 ~uR 12
1  e R+a  ~uR2 + 1  e (R )
(this shows that it is negative)
=  
 
1  12e R+

1
2e
 R+a uR2
1  e R+a  ~uR2 + 1  e (R )
=  
1
2e
a uR2

ea 
uR
2 +
p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL

eR
p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
=   e
a uR2
e + ea 
uR
2 +
p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
 
1 +
ea 
uR
2p
e2 + e2a uR   e +a+ 12uL
!
Lemma 6.11 @a^(a;uR;uL)@~uR < 0 if  >
uR+uL
4
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Proof.
@ (a;uR; uL; )
@uR
=  1
2
(1 + )
ea 
uR
2
eR
+
1
4
e2a uRq
e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2
0@ 1q
e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2
  1 + 
eR
1A
 1
4
1
2e
  a+ 12uRq
e2 + e 2a ~uL   e a + ~uR2
0@ 1q
e2 + e 2a ~uL   e a + ~uR2
  1 + 
e L
1A
=  1
2
(1 + )
ea 
uR
2
eR
+
1
4
ea 
uR
2
eR
ea 
uR
2
 
1
2e
 + 12e
a uR2
  12 (1 + 2)
q
e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2
!
e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2
 1
4
1
2e
  a+ 12uRq
e2 + e 2a ~uL   e a + ~uR2
0@ 1q
e2 + e 2a ~uL   e a + ~uR2
  1 + 
e L
1A .
So @(a;uR;uL;)@uR < 0 if
ea 
uR
2

e + ea 
uR
2   (1 + 2)
q
e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2

< 4

e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2

.
If 2 > uR+uL2 , then
e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2
=

e   ea uR2
2
+ 2e+a 
uR
2   ea +uL2


e   ea uR2
2
+ e+a 
uR
2 .
Then
ea 
uR
2

e + ea 
uR
2   (1 + 2)
q
e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2

 ea uR2

e + ea 
uR
2  
e   ea uR2 
= ea 
uR
2 2 min
n
e; ea 
uR
2
o
 2e+a uR2
 2

e   ea uR2
2
+ e+a 
uR
2

 4

e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2

.
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So 2 > uR+uL2 is su¢ cient for 
0 (a) 2 (0; 1) for all a and @(a;uR;uL;)@uR < 0.
In fact, because
ea 
uR
2

e + ea 
uR
2   (1 + 2)
q
e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2

< 2

e   ea uR2
2
+ e+a 
uR
2

we get
@ (a;uR; uL; )
@uR
<  1
2
ea 
uR
2
eR
0BB@1 +   e
a uR2

e + ea 
uR
2   (1 + 2)
q
e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2

4

e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2

1CCA
<  1
2
ea 
uR
2
eR
2

e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2

+ 2

e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2

 2

e   ea uR2
2
+ e+a 
uR
2

4

e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2

=  1
2
ea 
uR
2
eR
0@1
2
+
2

e+a 
uR
2   ea + ~uL2

4

e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2

1A
<  1
4
ea 
uR
2
eR
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@R
@uL
=
@R (a;uR; uL)
@a
@a
@uL
+
@R (a;uR; uL)
@uL
=
@R (a;uR; uL)
@a
@a^(a;uR;uL)
@uL
1  a^0 (a) +
@R (a;uR; uL)
@uL
>
1
4
1
e

R
1
2
q
e2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2
1
e L (1  0 (a))

24 qe2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2 ea uR2 + e2a uR   12e +a+uL2  e a uL2
  (1  0 (a)) e Le +a+ 12uL
35
/
24 qe2 + e2a ~uR   ea + ~uL2 ea uR2 + e2a uR   12e +a+uL2  e a uL2
  (1  0 (a)) e Le +a+ 12uL
35
>
1
2
e 
uR+uL
2 +
3
2
ea uR 
uL
2   1
2
e 
 

e + e a 
1
2uL

e +a+
1
2uL
>
1
2
e 
uR+uL
2  

e  + ea+
uL
2

+
3
2
ea uR 
uL
2   1
2
e 
=
1
2
e 
uR+uL
2   3
2
e  + ea
+uL2

3
2
e (uR+uL)   1

.
Therefore, @

R
@uL
> 0 if
1. uR + uL < log 32 and 2   uR+uL2 > log 3, or
2. 12e
 uR+uL2   32e  + e
uL
2
 
3
2e
 (uR+uL)   1 > 0 and uR > uL because in
that case, a < 0.
Lemma 6.12 When preference intensity on both sides are equal, the ex ante
probability that over coordination happens decreases with  if u < 0 and  >
log 32 .
Proof. This is because
@R (u; u; ; )
@
= e 

R
e +
e2+ 12 e
 +u
2p
e2+e 
u
2  e +u2
2
< e 

R
e + e
ur
2 + e
2+e 
u
2  e +u2p
e2+e 
u
2  e +u2
2
< 1
because 32e
 +u2   e u2 = e u2   32e +u   1 < e u2   32e    1 < 0 because
u < 0 and  > log 32 . Thus the derivative of the ex ante probability of over
46
coordination w.r.t.  is
@
 
e    e R
@
=  

e    e R @

R (u; u; ; )
@

< 

e 

R   e 

< 0.
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